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one’s main interest is faith and reason, but a rounded picture of Farrer’s
importance as a philosophical theologian is distorted if his spirituality is
allowed to overshadow his philosophy and theology. As I say, what has
impressed enthusiasts for Farrer’s work is the way he combined these elements and held them in creative tension.
Certainly Zeno’s paradox solvitur ambulando. But it is also solved by rational reflection on the difference between continual motion and segmental
haltings. Similarly, the paradox of faith solvitur immolando. But it is also
open to the rational support and clarification by what Rowan Williams
called Farrer’s “viable and sophisticated natural theology,” of which Austin
Farrer remained a masterful exponent till the end.

Philosophical Religions from Plato to Spinoza: Reason, Religion, and Autonomy,
by Carlos Fraenkel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 358
pages. $79.00 (hardcover).
JAMES BRYSON, McGill University
In a bold and exciting new book, Carlos Fraenkel traces a tradition of what
he calls “philosophical religion” from its beginnings in ancient Athens
through Jewish and Christian Alexandria and through medieval Arabic
falsafa, arriving finally at the early modern thought of Spinoza, who represents both the culmination of this tradition as well as a challenge to its
legitimacy by planting the seeds of biblical criticism. This is no mere historical exercise. Fraenkel presents philosophical religion as a response to
the Enlightenment confidence in the rational autonomy of the individual,
which he sees as the greatest challenge to maintaining religious culture
within the parameters of evolving modern institutions that prize the
equality of all persons ahead of religious authority.
Fraenkel explains that the post-Enlightenment consensus which separates philosophy from religion would puzzle historical proponents of
philosophical religion, who are called to become God-like through the
perfection of reason, as Plato teaches in the Theaetetus. Thus philosophy
is the highest form of worship, for which it simultaneously provides the
foundation. Beginning with the metaphysical concept that God is Reason,
historical forms of religion are regarded as exhortations to the practice
of philosophy. Homer, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed employ revelation
as a tool to set their respective religious communities, composed principally of non-philosophers, on a path to the philosophical life. This way of
reading historical religion is an alternative to cultural revolution, which
would remake society in the image of an ideal Republic based on pure
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philosophy, leaving no room for historical revelation claims. There is an
element of realpolitik for a philosophical religion that is content with citizens making a discrete contribution to the overall good of society without
being fully aware of its greater purpose. Acting as philosophy’s handmaid,
religion is directed towards the good order of the polis, “a community . . .
best described as a theocracy, a community ruled by God” (6). Through
the rational autonomy theosis provides the ruling philosophical elite, the
hoi polloi share in the political autonomy of their society. And while in
principle the imagined stories of the people are superfluous, their use is
restored by the philosopher king, a thesis reminiscent of Luc Brisson’s important work on how Plato saved the myths.
While Fraenkel provides a wonderfully dynamic survey of philosophical religion in all three of the great Abrahamic faiths, he claims that it is
Christians who push the concept furthest by making Christ the Logos or
Mind (Nous) itself. In this way, all people, insofar as they are philosophical, are implicitly Christians. As students of Philo Judaeus, Clement and
Origen of Alexandria inherited the problem that their master made central: how to integrate the historical forms of their religion with Platonic
philosophy. The Logos shows the way. In virtue of his knowledge of the
Logos, Plato becomes a prophet alongside Moses and Christ. All prophets
make the Logos central, which the Alexandrian Christians show through an
allegorical reading of the Septuagint.
After a fascinating account of shariah as a call to the Noetic life in
Al-Farabi and Moses Maimonides, and an interlude on the mediation
of Averroes to early modern philosophy by way of the Averroist Elijah
Delmedigo, Fraenkel arrives at the innovative reception of philosophical
religion by the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza. Tainted for posterity
by accusations of atheism by certain of his contemporaries, Spinoza is
rehabilitated by Fraenkel as a proponent of philosophical religion, which
consists for him in a “philosophical reinterpretation of Christianity”
(216). Spinoza is ambiguous about the relation between philosophy and
religion since he both affirms and denies that the God of the philosophers
is the God of the Bible. He ultimately rejects the false alternatives of “dogmatism”—which subordinates Scripture to reason—and “skepticism”—
which sets the authority of Scripture over reason—standing firmly in the
tradition of philosophical religion by accommodating its pedagogicalpolitical aims, wherein our capacity for self-rule should mirror God’s.
Fraenkel suggests that Spinoza’s method, though proposed for a Christian
audience, could equally apply to, say, Islam “[h]ad Spinoza lived in a
Muslim country” (275). Ironically, such an approach leaves itself open to
the “secularization of the West” and “undermines any attempt to reinterpret a religious or cultural tradition in light of intellectual commitments
not derived from the text” (281).
Fraenkel admits there is a shadow-history here which he does not take
up, equally important to understanding the historical interactions of philosophy and religion in the Abrahamic tradition, namely the Neoplatonic
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(25). Though Neoplatonism clearly influenced Spinoza, the differences
are fundamental. For example, as Fraenkel points out, as exhaustive substance, God is causa sui for Spinoza (264), a formula which can be traced
back to Plotinus, but which Proclus says the father of Neoplatonism uses
only metaphorically, since the very structure of reality implies that every
cause is greater than its effect. Because he rejects the hierarchically ordered
Neoplatonic cosmos, Spinoza is engaged in the philosophical reinterpretation of Christianity only in the broadest sense, since he sees no reason
for mediation between God and his creatures: Mind exhausts all that is. It
is for this reason, although Fraenkel does not include them amongst the
Dutch philosopher’s contemporary critics, that the Cambridge Platonists
associated Spinoza’s philosophy with atheism. If Fraenkel had begun
with, say, the Symposium—where philosophy is not defined by what it has
but by what it lacks—or the Parmenides—which makes the One non-being
fundamental—rather than the Republic, or indeed stressed certain bits of
that dialogue where Plato declares that the Good is superior to knowledge
and being in rank and power (509 B), his story might have reached a different outcome.
Counterfactuals aside, this study is to be commended for both the
breadth and depth of its learning, and should inspire a rich scholarly dialogue going forward. It is especially important that Fraenkel demonstrates
the continuity of Greek philosophy in the medieval period, that this continuity is common to Jews, Christians and Muslims, and that, moreover,
such questions remained and remain relevant for Enlightenment and contemporary philosophy and politics.

